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INTRODUCTION
Municipal litigation is on the rise. Commentators have championed
affirmative litigation by local governments as a means of vindicating
citizens’ rights and interests.1 Meanwhile, the Chamber of Commerce has
identified municipal litigation as a pressing threat to business and
proposed a laundry list of mechanisms state legislatures could use to rein
in, hobble, or outright prohibit local suits.2 Such opposition isn’t
surprising. The Chamber has targeted litigation by state attorneys general
(AGs), too,3 and from a defense-side perspective local litigation must look
like state litigation on steroids: tens of thousands of potential plaintiffs,
often using private lawyers to raise claims that may not be available to
private parties.

*
Robert G. Seaks LL.B. ’34 Professor of Law, Duke University. Thanks to
participants in the Public Law in the States Conference at Wisconsin Law School for
valuable input and to the conference organizers for the invitation to contribute. Jane
Bahnson of Duke Law Library and law students Alejandra Mena, DH Nam, and Catherine
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1.
See infra Section I.A.
2.
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, MITIGATING MUNICIPALITY
LITIGATION: SCOPE AND SOLUTIONS 14–18, 20 (2019).
3.
See generally, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ENFORCEMENT
GONE AMOK: THE MANY FACES OF OVER-ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 10–14, 33–
34 (2016); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNFAIR PRACTICES OR UNFAIR
ENFORCEMENT? EXAMINING THE USE OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES
(UDAP) LAWS BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 1–5 (2016); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, ENFORCEMENT SLUSH FUNDS: FUNDING FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES
WITH ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDS 23–24, 33–35 (2015).
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If your enemy’s enemy is your friend, one would expect state and
local litigators to be natural allies, pursuing complementary claims against
those responsible for harm to state and local governments and citizens. Yet
local suits sometimes have been met with opposition from state AGs
themselves. The sprawling opioid litigation has brought such conflicts into
the public eye.4 In Ohio, for example, the AG sought mandamus to prevent
counties and cities from pursuing claims on behalf of residents that, he
argued, “belong[ed] to” the state.5 AGs from multiple other states filed an
amicus brief in support of the Ohio AG.6 Skirmishes have erupted in other
states as well, as AGs and local litigators clash over which level of
government should exercise control.7
Of course, conflicts between state and local governments are not
uncommon these days. Others have analyzed state legislatures’
increasingly aggressive use of preemption to curb local regulatory
authority.8 The battles over preemption track familiar political patterns:
red states vs. blue cities.9 Conflicts between state and local litigators are
more complicated, defying easy categorization. Litigation conflicts are
relatively rare and balanced by cases in which state AGs actively support,
join, or replicate local efforts.10 Where conflicts emerge, they don’t always
(or even usually) involve Republican AGs facing off against Democrats at
the local level. That’s not to say politics play no role in the kinds of
arguments AGs make against local litigation. Anecdotally, at least,
Republican AGs appear to be more likely to challenge local litigation on
grounds that would dampen the overall level of enforcement. But in other
instances, conflicts involve co-partisans or bipartisan groups on one or

4.
For a recent overview of the opioid litigation and the relationship between
state and local efforts, see Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL Revolution,
96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2021).
5.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus of State of Ohio, In re State of Ohio, No. 17md-02084 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 30, 2019).
6.
Brief of Amici Curiae States of Michigan et al., In re National Prescription
Opiate Litigation, No. 19-3827 (6th Cir. filed Sept. 6, 2019).
7.
See infra Part II.
8.
See generally, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption,
70 STAN. L. REV. 1995 (2018).
9.
See, e.g., id. at 1997–98 (“[T]he preponderance of new preemption actions
and proposals have been advanced by Republican-dominated state governments, embrace
conservative economic and social causes, and respond to—and are designed to block—
relatively progressive local regulations.”); Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State
Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS 403, 406, 412
(2017).
10.
See Sarah L. Swan, Preempting Plaintiff Cities, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1241,
1244 (2018) (contrasting regulatory and litigation preemption and observing that “states
have adopted a relatively restrained approach to city litigation, and much city litigation
continues unimpeded by state intervention”).
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both sides and focus primarily on which level of government can better
represent its citizens in court.11
This Essay uses the opioid litigation and other disputes between AGs
and local attorneys in an effort to better understand the relationship
between state and local litigation. Scholarship on these two forms of public
litigation has tended to travel separate paths, with scholars addressing one
or the other but rarely the two together. I take a more inclusive view here,
seeking both to highlight the functional similarities between local and state
litigation and to draw out the differences. I begin in Part I by situating local
litigation in relation to affirmative litigation by state AGs and
underscoring the significant points of overlap in the arguments offered in
support of and against each type. Part II then identifies recurring themes
in cases in which state and local litigation have come into conflict.
Although I offer some assessments of the arguments AGs have made in
opposition to local litigation, I do not purport to offer a comprehensive
analysis—much less resolution—of the disputes. Instead, my goal is
largely to flag questions worthy of study and elaboration beyond what I
can offer in this Essay. For the most part, I suggest, conflicts between AGs
and local attorneys turn not on characteristics intrinsic to local or state
government, but on advantages and disadvantages that flow from state
law—and which state law could (and in some cases should) change.
Before proceeding, a word on terminology: Terms like “local
litigation” and “municipal litigation” obscure a great deal of variation in
the types of government entities that may pursue affirmative litigation and
in the processes they may use to authorize, investigate, and litigate their
cases. Proponents of local litigation authority tend to focus on cities as
their prototypical plaintiffs, while critics paint with a broader brush. I
elaborate on these points below, where heterogeneity in local litigation is
relevant to the arguments under consideration, but generally use the catchall “local” to refer to any governmental unit inferior to the state.
I. PARALLELS BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL LITIGATION
Local litigation has emerged as a powerful force in recent years.12 A
handful of cities joined the prominent state-led litigation targeting harms

11.
See infra Part II.
12.
This trail has been well blazed by others. Terrific resources on local litigation
include Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local
Public Law Offices, in WHY LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC
INTEREST ADVOCACY 51 (2008) [hereinafter Morris, Rising Culture]; Kathleen S. Morris,
Cities Seeking Justice: Local Government Litigation in the Public Interest, in HOW CITIES
WILL SAVE THE WORLD 189 (Ray Brescia & John Travis Marshall, eds., 2016) [hereinafter
Morris, Cities Seeking Justice]; Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State
and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903 (2016) [hereinafter
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from tobacco and asbestos in the 1980s and 1990s.13 In the decades that
followed, local claims have become increasingly common.14 In some
instances, as in the tobacco and asbestos cases, localities have worked with
state AGs as litigation partners.15 In many others, local governments have
gone it alone, targeting a wide range of issues, including defective
products, mortgage lending practices, toxic waste dumping, climate
change, and firearm safety.16
The rise in local litigation has been fueled in part by increased
capacity at the local level. Some big cities have created dedicated
departments that focus on affirmative litigation; others have partnered
with law school clinics to support affirmative litigation efforts.17 And
many other local government units—not just cities, but also counties,
townships, villages, school boards, water districts, etc.—have discovered
fruitful partnerships with private lawyers who are willing to represent the
local government on a contingent basis, taking fees as a percentage of any
financial recovery.18
For those who have watched the development of state litigation, this
evolution will seem familiar. Like local litigation, state litigation has
gained prominence over the last several decades—with Big Tobacco
marking a pivotal chapter in the creation story—and state AGs’ offices
have seen commensurate growth in both size and stature as they have
shifted from a focus on defense to a more ambitious role in affirmative
litigation.19 As is true of many local suits, the shift in state litigation was
stimulated by shortfalls in other forms of government action, including
regulation and enforcement by federal agencies.20 And, like their local
counterparts, state litigators have vastly expanded their capacity by

Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement]; Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV.
1227 (2018); Swan, supra note 10.
13.
Swan, supra note 12, at 1230.
14.
Id. at 1230–31.
15.
Id.
16.
See, e.g., JILL HABIG, CHRISTINE KWON, JOANNA PEARL, MARISSA ROY &
PALAK SHETH, LOCAL ACTION, NATIONAL IMPACT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO AFFIRMATIVE
LITIGATION FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 6–13 (2019) [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK] (collecting
examples); Morris, Cities Seeking Justice, supra note 12, at 192–201 (same).
17.
Morris, Rising Culture, supra note 12, at 54–55.
18.
See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, More Cities Suit Up for Legal Actions, WALL ST. J.
(May 3, 2016, 4:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-cities-suit-up-for-legalactions-1462218870 [https://perma.cc/WX4V-H7UP].
19.
See Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests:
Attorneys General as Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1236 (2015); Morris, Rising Culture,
supra note 12, at 54–56.
20.
See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 698, 712, 719 (2011) (discussing states’ responses to downturns in enforcement by
federal government); GUIDEBOOK, supra note 16, at 5 (citing “state or federal inaction” as
reasons for affirmative local litigation).
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partnering with private lawyers eager to share in the advantages of
government litigation.21
Given the similar trajectories state and local litigation have followed,
it is perhaps no surprise that the emerging normative case for (and against)
the latter bears a marked resemblance to arguments that have been made
about the former. Yet local litigation is distinct from state litigation in
important ways, both formally and functionally. Indeed, when they
challenge local litigation, a common theme from state AGs is that local
suits are different from suits by the AG.22 A key distinction concerns the
sovereign status of state and local governments. States are independent
sovereigns—a status that provides both doctrinal and normative heft to
their claims of litigation authority.23 Cities and other local government
units, by contrast, are not independent sovereigns but appendages of the
state.24 Like private corporations, “municipal corporations” are creatures
of state law, and they exist at the sufferance of the state.25 Unlike private
corporations, however, municipalities also are sites of democratic
governance—and it is that feature that animates both defenses and
critiques of local litigation.26
A. The Case for State (and Local) Litigation
One of the most important arguments in favor of state litigation
sounds in democratic accountability. Litigation often affects individuals
and entities who are not parties to the case, including by causing the
defendant to change its behavior in ways that extend beyond the
21.
See Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515,
532–33 (2016) (discussing use of private counsel by state and local governments).
22.
See infra Part II.
23.
States’ sovereign status allows them to sue as parens patriae, for example,
based on their “quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and
economic—of [their] residents in general.” Alfred A. Snap & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458
U.S. 592, 607 (1982); see also Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney
General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L.
REV. 1859, 1863–71 (2000).
24.
See David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the
Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2233 (2006) (“State control over cities is, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, extremely broad.”). As a consequence, as Kathleen Engel has
detailed, “[t]he federal courts have unequivocally held that political subdivisions cannot
bring claims as parens patriae because their power is derivative, not sovereign.” Kathleen
C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38
CONN. L. REV. 355, 365 (2006).
25.
See, e.g., Kathleen Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement,
47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1–26 (2012) (describing and critiquing conventional view
that cities are “mere instrumentalities of their state governments”).
26.
See Morris, Rising Culture, supra note 12, at 52–53 (“[San Francisco] serves
two different but equally important roles: it is a public management corporation, and it is
a unit of representative democracy.”).
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plaintiff(s). Successful litigation, or merely the threat of litigation, also can
have a deterrent effect on actors similar to the defendant, causing them to
modify their own behavior for fear of sanction.27 Litigation can reshape
industry practices and reform institutions; and it can shape the law by
generating judicial decisions that expand or constrict the scope of rights
and duties.28 Hence the pejorative term “regulation by litigation”29—a
phrase that highlights the reality that the effects of litigation are often
regulatory in nature—and the more complimentary “private attorney
general,” used to describe private parties and lawyers whose suits serve
social goals of deterrence and harm reduction.30 Once one recognizes the
unavoidably public character of litigation, vesting litigation authority in an
actual attorney general—independently elected in most states, duty-bound
to serve the public interest in all31—seems like an obvious plus. Notions
of democratic accountability and responsiveness therefore are central to
analyses of affirmative litigation by state AGs.32
Proponents of local litigation likewise have highlighted democratic
accountability as a benefit of affirmative litigation by local government
units.33 The force of the claim probably depends on context, and one might
sensibly be skeptical about the potential for meaningful accountability in
the face of low-salience (or uncontested) local elections and minimal
public information about litigation. Similar points could be made about
state litigation, as I have argued in other work.34 Yet the variation is even
more pronounced at the local level. There are vast differences between,
say, a city attorney’s office with a dedicated unit for affirmative litigation
and a county prosecutor with a small staff and budget and a docket of
mostly criminal cases, for whom affirmative civil litigation is far from the
core of the job. How those differences play out in terms of accountability
is an interesting and complicated question.35 Local cases also may be
27.
Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and
Independence for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 946 (2017).
28.
See Lemos, supra note 20, at 737–41 (describing policymaking via state
litigation enforcing statutory rights and duties).
29.
ANDREW P. MORRISS, BRUCE YANDLE & ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION
BY LITIGATION I (2009).
30.
E.g., William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—
and Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2140–55 (2004).
31.
Lemos, supra note 27, at 945.
32.
See, e.g., id. at 943–56 (discussing common assumption that government
litigators are and should be democratically accountable and developing a theory of
accountability for public enforcement).
33.
See, e.g., Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational Standing for Cities, 47
CONN. L. REV. 59, 89–90 (2014); Morris, supra note 25, at 39–40.
34.
See Lemos, supra note 27, at 979–89.
35.
Compare Darien Shanske, Response, Colloquium: The Case for Local
Constitutional Enforcement, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (July 11, 2012),
http://harvardcrcl.org/cr-cl-presents-a-colloquium-the-case-for-local-constitutional-
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spearheaded by different categories of elected officials, most notably
mayors, who may be sufficiently high-profile as to draw attention to the
issue.36 And there’s much to be unpacked about how local governments
make decisions about litigation—and how those processes link up to
claims about democratic authorization and accountability. In some local
cases, for example, the city council has held a public vote to authorize the
litigation.37 Scholars have used the town-hall metaphor in debates about
private class actions, but local litigation creates the potential—and
sometimes the reality—of a literal town hall discussion of the case.
A second theme in arguments in favor of state litigation is that state
AGs are likely to be good representatives for the state’s citizens for a
variety of reasons linked to AGs’ expertise and incentives. Unlike private
parties, state AGs and other officials can bring a perspective rooted in
actual governance, offering a wider lens than that typically available to
private parties but attuned to local conditions in a way that may not be true
of the federal government.38 Advocates of local litigation have made
similar arguments. Kaitlin Caruso, for example, notes that local
governments “interact with their residents each day” and thus have “an

enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/5TKG-KBHK] (suggesting that arguments in favor of local
authority to raise constitutional claims for citizens “appear stronger . . . insofar as the
localities in question are cities, especially older, larger cities. Special districts, Lakewood
plan cities, even school districts – all of these entities do not seem to be equally attractive
defenders of constitutional values.”), with David Schleicher, Federalism and State
Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 776 (2017) (discussing evidence that voters in smaller,
less-population-dense areas may attend more closely to local elections than voters in big
cities, though the type of office also matters).
36.
The mayor of Reno, Nevada, for example, was the public figurehead of the
city’s opioids suit, which was prosecuted by private attorneys. See, e.g., City of Reno Files
Lawsuit Against Distributors, Manufacturers of Opioids, NEWS 4 (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://mynews4.com/news/local/city-of-reno-files-lawsuit-against-distributorsmanufacturers-of-opioids [https://perma.cc/ZPZ9-XFUA] (quoting mayor for the
announcement of the case); Riley Snyder, Reno Mayor Blasts Laxalt for Pitting ‘Nevadans
Against Nevadans’ Amid Opioid Lawsuit Disagreement, NEV. INDEP. (Nov. 13, 2017, 12:08
PM),
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/reno-mayor-blasts-laxalt-for-pittingnevadans-against-nevadans-amid-opioid-lawsuit-disagreement [https://perma.cc/6T3QRGMU] (describing the clash between the Reno mayor and Nevada AG over the city’s
suit).
37.
Reno’s opioid suit, described in the previous note, is an example. Michael
Scott Davidson, Reno Follows Clark County in Using Las Vegas Law Firm for Opioid
REV.-J.
(Jan.
10,
2018,
6:24
PM),
Litigation,
L.V.
https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-government/clark-county/renofollows-clark-county-in-using-las-vegas-law-firm-for-opioid-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/C7VC-KB62] (describing vote by the Reno City Council); see also
William Crum, Oklahoma City Council Moves Ahead with Opioid Litigation, OKLAHOMAN
(Aug. 1, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.oklahoman.com/article/5603264/oklahoma-citycouncil-moves-ahead-with-opioid-litigation [https://perma.cc/R98X-86E7] (describing
vote by city council “after discussions and negotiations that lasted much of the summer”).
38.
See Lemos, supra note 20, at 721.
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excellent vantage point for recognizing patterns of harm affecting their
communities.”39
Not only can state and local governments notice harms that federal
enforcers might miss and private enforcers might fail to pursue, but those
patterns of harm also often translate into injuries to the government itself.
Many local-government claims rest on allegations of harm to the
government—that is, so-called proprietary claims in which the
municipality seeks to recover losses that it incurred as a result of the
defendant’s actions.40 Again, the same is true of state litigation.41 For
defenders of government litigation, this is a feature, not a bug: the idea is
that there is an identity of interest between local governments and their
citizens because the harms suffered by residents often cause harm to the
local government as well.42
Importantly, proponents argue, government attorneys (again, state or
local) are well situated to pursue such claims. Like their counterparts at
the state level, local attorneys are sworn to pursue the public interest rather
than the interest of any particular individual or group.43 And, because state
and local government attorneys are paid salaries rather than hourly or
contingent rates, they have incentives to prioritize cases with the most
public benefit rather than the highest payout and to seek remedies that get
to the heart of the problem rather than focusing on financial recoveries.44
If litigation is successful, moreover, attorney’s fees need not be carved out

39.
Caruso, supra note 33, at 61; see Morris, Rising Culture, supra note 12, at
59–60.
40.
See, e.g., Caruso, supra note 33, at 62 (“Without standing to litigate on
residents’ behalf, many cities strain to identify harm to their own interests in order to bring
a suit . . . .”). The many local suits against e-cigarette giant JUUL offer a recent example.
Although in one sense the litigation is focused on harm to local citizens—underage
vapers—the relevant injury for standing purposes is to the plaintiff government units
themselves, and the complaints explain in detail how treating, and attempting to combat,
teen vaping affects public resources. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, 54–69, Illinois ex rel.
Nerheim v. JUUL Labs, Inc., No. 19L 00000571 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 13, 2019).
41.
See Seth Davis, The New Public Standing, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1229, 1233
(2019) (“State standing to sue the federal government for financial injuries is ‘the new
public standing.’”).
42.
Caruso, supra note 33, at 61 (noting that “a city’s welfare is intimately
intertwined with that of its residents”); see also Swan, supra note 12, at 1251 (elaborating
on the local government-citizen relationship).
43.
See Caruso, supra note 33, at 90 (noting that city officials “are often
accountable to a smaller, narrower ‘public interest’ than attorneys general”); NAT’L DIST.
ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1–1.2 (3d ed. 2009),
https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.-w-Revised-Commentary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JLL2-XWHT].
44.
See Lemos, supra note 21, at 525–27 (contrasting incentives of public and
private litigators and linking salaries and other institutional features of public litigation to
pursuit of public interest).
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of public recoveries; the money can go directly to supporting the relevant
government and its citizens.
B. Critiques of State (and Local) Litigation
If the arguments in favor of local litigation are similar to those made
by proponents of state litigation, so, too, are the critiques. A frequent
complaint about state litigation is that it is regulation in disguise.45
“Regulation by litigation” may be problematic for process reasons—that
is, if litigation affords fewer opportunities for meaningful democratic input
and engagement, and for checks by other political actors, than do
regulatory processes—or because it empowers state AGs to reach issues
over which state governments lack regulatory authority.46 Similar
arguments have been lodged by critics of local litigation. The Chamber of
Commerce, for example, has identified local litigation as a “usurpation of
state power” because “[m]unicipalities . . . may pursue litigation as a
shortcut to solve public problems that otherwise would be addressed
legislatively.”47 “Regulatory action,” the argument continues, “is typically
the province of state legislators who are also elected to represent
constituents in a statewide body.”48
As the quotes from the Chamber of Commerce suggest, critiques
about regulation by litigation often bleed into arguments about the
potential for public litigation to extend beyond the jurisdiction of the
plaintiff government. Just as state litigation may, as a practical matter,
resolve issues of nationwide concern, so, too, local litigation may impact
the state as a whole.49 Thus, critics of state litigation argue that AGs should
step aside and leave matters to the federal government, while critics of
local suits point to the state as the appropriate unit of government.50
Related to this second strand of critique is a set of concerns about
appropriate uses of public litigation authority and how decentralized
litigation authority coheres (or not) with theories of federalism. Professors
Ernie Young and Lynn Baker coined the term “horizontal
45.
See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 27, at 948–49 (discussing critique of state
litigation as regulatory).
46.
Lester Brickman, Regulation by Litigation: The New Wave of GovernmentSponsored Litigation, 1 MANHATTAN INST.: CONF. SERIES 27, 29–31 (1999),
https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/mics1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW27-R9R2].
47.
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 2, at 16.
48.
Id.; cf. Swan, supra note 12, at 1251–52 (discussing instances in which
courts have held that local litigation authority is impliedly limited by state laws preempting
local regulatory authority).
49.
See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 8–9 (detailing potential
for statewide impact of local claims in opioid litigation).
50.
See Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 1998–2000 (2001);
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 2, at 15–16.
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aggrandizement” to refer to the process by which a state, or group of states,
uses federal law to impose its policy preferences on the rest of the
country.51 Litigation can have similar effects—for example, where a state
or group of states persuades the Supreme Court to adopt a new
constitutional principle that limits state power. As Professor Young and I
have argued in other work, such advocacy sits uneasily with federalismbased justifications for state litigation authority.52 And the same has been
said, in somewhat different terms, of local litigation.53
Critics of both state and local litigation also have highlighted the role
private attorneys often play in such litigation. Like so much else about
public litigation, the objection traces back to Big Tobacco, in which the
states were represented by some of the same attorneys who had litigated
unsuccessful private suits.54 Coordinated action by state AGs proved
successful where private efforts had failed,55 the attorneys earned a great
deal of money,56 and observers learned two important facts about public
litigation. First, government plaintiffs often enjoy significant advantages
over private parties.57 For example, when AGs sue in a representative
capacity as parens patriae, they can “avoid difficult questions of
predominance that [might] doom[] [a] class action[] [in which]
individualized evidence of injury or causation” would be required, and
state statutes often permit government plaintiffs to prevail upon a showing
of a violation without a need for proof of causation and damages.58 Second,
partnerships with private attorneys can create a win-win situation in which
resource-strapped government offices obtain high-caliber legal
representation without having to risk any public funds, while private
51.
Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 109–10 (2001) (defining and contrasting “vertical” and
“horizontal aggrandizements”).
52.
Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an
Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 96–105 (2018).
53.
See, e.g., Barron, supra note 24, at 2222 (arguing that cities “have no
sufficient interest in pressing” claims that “would not expand local policymaking discretion
but instead bind every locality to follow a single course”).
54.
See Howard M. Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits: Plaintiffs’
Attorneys in Municipal Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE
CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 129, 136 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005)
(discussing the relationship between state suits and lawyers who had spearheaded the large
Castano private class action).
55.
Lemos & Young, supra note 52, at 69–70.
56.
See, e.g., Michael Debow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation
of Powers in State Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 568
(2001).
57.
Lemos & Young, supra note 52, at 69–72 (discussing states’ litigation
advantages in general and in tobacco litigation specifically).
58.
Id. at 119–21 (summarizing litigation advantages for state AGs); see also
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 16, at 14 (“[A]s a public office, you can take advantage of tools
that are not available to private plaintiffs.”).
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attorneys can earn hefty fees by taking advantage of the state’s capacity to
bring claims unavailable to private plaintiffs.59 Defense-side critics cried
foul, and even some otherwise-sympathetic defenders of state litigation
raised objections to unfettered reliance on private counsel.60 Similar
arguments are now being made, unsurprisingly, about local litigation.61
II. DIFFERENCE AND CONFLICT IN STATE AND LOCAL LITIGATION
Although I can only sketch the outlines in this Essay, I’ve sought to
illustrate the substantial overlap between arguments for and against both
state and local litigation. Given these similarities, conflicts between state
and local litigators in the opioid litigation and elsewhere present
something of a puzzle. If state and local litigation are two means to the
same end—promoting the interests of the state’s citizens—why do they
come into conflict? And if state AGs appreciate the arguments in favor of
state litigation—as presumably they do—why do they not see the same
value in the local equivalent?
An obvious rejoinder, informed by the preemption wars noted in the
Introduction, is, “It’s politics, stupid.” Put somewhat more delicately,
perhaps states and localities are pursuing different visions of the public
interest because they serve different constituencies. That may well be true
in some cases, but state-local conflicts over litigation do not reliably fit the
red state/blue city frame that explains so much of the recent conflict over
regulatory authority. Nor do state-local litigation conflicts consistently
take the form of a local government that wishes to target a particular
defendant pitted against a state that wishes to leave that defendant alone.
In that sense, litigation conflicts also diverge from the deregulatory vs.
pro-regulatory pattern we see in the preemption context.62 Instead,
conflicts tend to arise when state and city both want to use litigation to
target the same perceived problem, often with effectively the same goals.
What they’re arguing about is who can do it better.
In the opioids litigation, for example, public clashes have erupted
between state AGs and local litigators in multiple states featuring a mix of

59.
Lemos, supra note 21, at 536; Lemos & Young, supra note 52, at 120–21.
60.
See Lemos, supra note 21, at 542–56 (collecting critiques).
61.
See generally U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, BIG BUCKS AND
LOCAL LAWYERS: THE INCREASING USE OF CONTINGENCY FEE LAWYERS BY LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS (2016).
62.
See Riverstone-Newell, supra note 9, at 404–07, 419 (describing “[t]he rise
in state preemption legislation as a means to undo progressive local policies” as “a
departure from preemption’s traditional use” in avoiding conflicts between different
approaches to regulation); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX.
L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2018) (“[M]uch of recent state law preemption is simply deregulatory.
The state law does not replace a local scheme of regulation with a contrary state one, but
rather simply bars the locality from regulating at all.”).

982

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Democrats and Republicans on both sides,63 and bipartisan groups of AG
weighed in on the massive opioid MDL to register their opposition to the
proposed negotiation class and other aspects of the proceedings.64 The
arguments aren’t about whether to use litigation to seek redress for the
harms caused by the opioid epidemic—at least in their public statements,
both sides take a tough-on-opioids stance65—but on who should lead the
charge. Unpacking these arguments, alongside similar claims made in
other state-local litigation conflicts, reveals five recurring themes,
explored below.

63.
See, e.g., infra notes 75–82 and accompanying text (describing conflict in
Arkansas between Republican AG and Democratic local attorneys); Lawyers Lash Becerra
Over Move to Restrict New Opioid Suits, RECORDER (Aug. 30, 2020),
https://plus.lexis.com/search?pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-RECRDR20200830LAWYERSLASHBECERRAOVERMOVETORESTRICTNEWOPIOIDSUIT
S&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdsourcegroupingtype=&pdisurlapi=true&pdmfid=1530
671&crid=e3b79664-6a2e-41ed-985d-14a851c30513
(describing
conflict
over
Democratic California AG’s support for legislation that would allow him to block new
opioid lawsuits by cities and counties); Prescription Opioid Cases, Order on Petition for
Coordination, Sup. Ct. Cal. (Sept. 6, 2019) (granting Democratic AG’s motion to
coordinate state suit with local suits and declining to rule on his request to assume control
over certain claims in the local suits brought on behalf of the People of the State); Riley
Snyder, Laxalt to Schieve: Reno Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers Could Undermine
Ongoing State Litigation, NEV. INDEP. (Nov. 9, 2017, 10:44 AM),
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/laxalt-to-schieve-reno-lawsuit-against-opioidmanufacturers-could-undermine-ongoing-state-litigation
[https://perma.cc/JKD7DWWT] (Republican AG urging Independent Mayor of Reno to abandon plans to initiate
opioid litigation on behalf of the city); OFF. OF TENN. ATT’Y GEN., STATEMENT ON OPIOID
LITIGATION (2018) (announcing Republican Tennessee AG Herbert Slatery’s efforts to
intervene in lawsuits led by three Republican district attorneys); OFF. OF TENN. ATT’Y GEN.,
LETTER ON OPIOID CASES FILED BY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS GENERAL (Mar. 15, 2018)
(expressing concerns about local suits); OFFS. OF TENN. DIST. ATT’YS GEN., LETTER FROM
14 DISTRICT ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO HERBERT H. SLATERY (Mar. 20, 2018) (defense of
local suits by group of local attorneys).
64.
See Brief of Amici States of Arizona et al., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., Nos. 19-4097, 19-4099 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2020), ECF No. 50; see also Amicus Letter
by Attorneys General Regarding Settlement Negotiation Class, In re Nat’l Prescription
Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio July 23, 2019) (objections backed by
bipartisan group of thirty-eight AGs); Letter to Court from Attorneys General, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio June 24, 2019) (objections
backed by twenty-six AGs); Brief of Amici Curiae States of Michigan et al., supra note 6;
see also George Jepsen & Perry Zinn Rowthorn, Leave Opioid Lawsuits to State Attorneys
General, WSJ: OPINION (Mar. 3, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/leaveopioid-lawsuits-to-state-attorneys-general-11551649471 [https://perma.cc/XJT8-LJZG]
(bipartisan op-ed by former AGs).
65.
See Snyder, supra note 63; STATEMENT ON OPIOID LITIGATION, supra note
63; LETTER ON OPIOID CASES FILED BY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 63;
LETTER FROM 14 DISTRICT ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO HERBERT H. SLATERY, supra note 63.
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A. Democratic Authorization and Its Limits
Recall that notions of democratic accountability feature prominently
in defenses of both state and local litigation authority.66 Such arguments
work best when there is substantial overlap between the governed—those
affected by the government action—and those who have the capacity to
participate in the democratic process, whether via a vote on the action itself
or, more commonly, on the representatives who are situated to decide on
the action. Absent a compelling theory of virtual representation, it’s hard
to get misty-eyed about the democratic process if Group A is selecting a
representative who will make choices governing Group B. Yet that’s
precisely what happens in government litigation, critics argue, citing the
problem of spillovers noted above.67
To be sure, the fact that litigation may affect third parties is by no
means unique to government: private litigation can and often does have
similar effects.68 Often, therefore, the most a “spillovers” argument can do
is undermine government litigants’ claim of democratic superiority; it
does not provide an affirmative reason to disfavor government litigation.
But when the effects of local litigation extend well beyond the boundaries
of the relevant jurisdiction, state AGs can use arguments about spillovers
to support a more pointed claim: the local government cannot represent
the interests of all those affected, but the state AG can.
It’s important to distinguish between two different strains of this
argument. In some cases, the claim of democratic superiority is pitched in
a formal and legal register. Ohio AG Dave Yost’s challenge to the local
opioids litigation is an example: “[O]nly Ohio, not its counties, has the
power and the right to represent the people of the state.”69 Well, maybe.
But the distribution of power depends on state law, and state law
sometimes explicitly authorizes local attorneys to sue on behalf of the state
and its people for specified harms.70 Consumer-protection laws, for
example, including states’ Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices
(UDAP) statutes, may authorize a district attorney, state’s attorney (both
typically elected at the county level71), or city or county attorney to seek

66.
See supra Section I.A.
67.
See supra Section I.B.
68.
Margaret H. Lemos, Three Models of Adjudicative Representation, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745–46, 1750–52 (2017).
69.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 15 (emphasis added).
70.
Cf. Brief of Amici States of Arizona et al., supra note 64, at 3 (arguing that
the proposed negotiation class in the opioid MDL improperly glossed over differences in
state law by lumping together localities that do have authority to make statewide claims
with those that do not).
71.
See generally Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121
YALE L.J. 1528 (2012) (discussing prevalence of county-elected state and district
attorneys).
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injunctive relief and civil penalties “in the name of” the state or its
citizens.72 Public nuisance laws also sometimes authorize suit by localities,
as well as by the AG.73 Indeed, localities in Ohio have statutory authority
to sue over public nuisances in the name of the state.74
The Arkansas opioid conflict offers another illustration. A coalition
of Arkansas counties and cities filed suit in state court against
pharmaceutical companies, retailers, pharmacists, and medical
providers.75 One of the plaintiffs was Scott Ellington, the Prosecuting
Attorney for the Second Judicial District of Arkansas, who was suing as a
relator on behalf of the state.76 Two weeks later, Arkansas AG Leslie
Rutledge filed her own suit on behalf of the state against three major opioid
manufacturers in a different state court.77 Rutledge then petitioned the state
supreme court for an emergency writ of mandamus ordering Ellington to
abandon the claims he brought on the state’s behalf.78 She argued that
72.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-11(a) (2021) (“Attorney General or the district
attorney acting in the name of the state . . . .”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17204, 17206
(West 2021) (authorizing suits by AG and variety of local lawyers “in the name of the
people of the State of California”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-112(1) (2021) (“The
attorney general or a district attorney may bring a civil action on behalf of the state . . . .”);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/7 (LexisNexis 2021) (“Attorney General or a State’s Attorney .
. . may bring an action in the name of the People of the State . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. §
598.0985 (2019–20) (authorizing district attorneys to seek to enjoin deceptive trade
practices “in the name of the State of Nevada”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-06 (2021) (“The
attorney general and the several state’s attorneys shall institute suits in behalf of this state
. . . .”); 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 756.1.A. (2021) (“The Attorney General or a district
attorney may bring an action . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.632 (2019) (“[A] prosecuting
attorney . . . may bring suit in the name of the State of Oregon . . . .”); 37 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. § 201-8 (West 2021) (“[T]he Attorney General, or the appropriate District
Attorney, acting in the name of the Commonwealth . . . may petition for recovery of civil
penalties and any other equitable relief . . . .”); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-121
(2021) (authorizing county attorneys, “on the request of the department [of justice] or
another county attorney, [to] initiate all procedures and prosecute actions in the same
manner as provided for the department”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-130 (2017) (authorizing
suit by “any solicitor or county or city attorney with prior approval of the Attorney
General”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-24 (2021) (“The state’s attorney with prior
approval of the attorney general may institute and prosecute actions hereunder in the same
manner as provided for the attorney general . . . .”).
73.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 52-205 (2021) (authorizing local government
entities to bring public nuisance claims); WIS. STAT. § 823.02 (2019–20) (same).
74.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.03 (LexisNexis 2021–22); see also id. §
4729.35 (authorizing the attorney general, the prosecuting attorney of any county, or the
state board of pharmacy to sue to enjoin violations of certain rules of the board of
pharmacy).
75.
See Second Amended Complaint, Arkansas ex rel. Ellington v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. CV-2018-268, 2018 WL 1868852 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Apr. 2, 2018).
76.
Id.
77.
Complaint at 1, Arkansas ex rel. Rutledge v. Purdue Pharma. L.P., 60CV18-2018 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2018).
78.
Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 1, Arkansas ex rel. Rutledge v.
Ellington, No. CV-18-296 (Ark. Apr. 2, 2018).
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“permitting a single prosecutor—who is accountable to only some
Arkansans—to direct the entire State’s actions would set a dangerous
precedent that is inconsistent with principles of representative
government.”79 But Rutledge faced a significant obstacle in Arkansas law,
which provides that “[a]ll actions in favor of and in which the state is
interested shall be brought in the name of the state and shall be prosecuted
by the prosecuting attorney.”80 Rutledge insisted that, when read in the
context of other Arkansas statutes, including those empowering the AG,
the provision is best understood to apply only to criminal cases.81
Nevertheless, the supreme court unanimously rejected her petition.82
Democratic objections may still be available where state law
empowers local government suits on behalf of the state—or where state
law is unclear on the question, as is arguably the case in Arkansas—but
the argument must move to a more functional and normative register: the
claim must be that the AG can better represent the interests at stake given
her superior claim to democratic accountability. The force of that claim
will depend, of course, on context—including the nature of the claims and
interests at issue and the processes that inform litigation decisions at the
local and state level. And the argument is more about the wisdom of state
law than the legality of the local suit. It’s worth noting, on that score, that
state law can authorize local governments to bring claims based on harm
to citizens that are more limited in scope than a suit on behalf of the entire
state. For example, Virginia authorizes city, county, and town attorneys to
sue under its UDAP statute on the same terms as the state AG but in the
name of the city, county, or town—not the commonwealth.83 Such an
approach finds analogs in federal statutes authorizing enforcement by state
AGs, which permit states to sue for harms to their own citizens.84 The
practical problem of spillovers may remain—a suit by New York might
affect life in New Jersey—but no state is empowered to sue on behalf of
the U.S. government or to represent citizens nationwide. Many federal
statutes that provide for state enforcement also require state AGs to give
prior notice to the relevant federal agency, permit that agency to intervene
79.
Id. at 3.
80.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-106-101 (2021).
81.
Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 78, at 10.
82.
Formal Order, Arkansas ex rel. Rutledge v. Ellington, No. CV-18-296 (Ark.
Apr. 2, 2018). The court’s one-page order offered no explanation of its reasoning.
83.
VA. CODE. ANN. §59.1-203 (2021); see also FLA. STAT. § 501.203(2)
(LexisNexis 2021) (defining “enforcing authority” as state attorney (a county-elected
officer) if violation “occurs in or affects the judicial circuit under the office’s jurisdiction”
and as state Department of Legal Affairs if violation “occurs in or affects more than one
judicial circuit”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-24-21 (2021) (providing that “[t]he district
attorney and county attorney shall, within their respective jurisdictions, have the same duty
and responsibility under this chapter as that of the attorney general statewide in the
enforcement thereof”) (emphasis added).
84.
See generally Lemos, supra note 20.
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in the case, and prohibit states from suing on violations that are the subject
of a pending federal enforcement action.85 State law could adopt a similar
model for local litigation, including in cases in which the local government
is authorized to sue on behalf of the state. Vermont’s law authorizes the
state’s attorney to sue in the name of the state but only “if authorized to
proceed by the Attorney General.”86 Although such laws share features in
common with the federal model, there’s a meaningful difference—in
theory, at least—between giving the AG a veto over local suits (as
Vermont’s law does) and allowing the state to join a local suit, as does the
federal model. The latter approach puts a thumb on the scale in favor of
enforcement, letting the federal government set the floor and empowering
states to do more. The Vermont approach, by contrast, gives the AG the
last word on how much public enforcement will take place, period.
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The Arkansas conflict described above illustrates a second set of
arguments that crop up in state-local conflicts over litigation, the thrust of
which is that the state AG should get priority because she is more likely to
succeed on the merits. It’s worth emphasizing at the outset that these
issues, too, turn on state law rather than on characteristics intrinsic to state
and local government. For better or worse, state law does sometimes give
the AG access to certain kinds of claims while withholding the same
advantages from both private litigants and local governments. Arkansas
law is perhaps a model of what not to do in this regard, as it appears to
give the local prosecuting attorney authority to bring all claims on behalf
of the state while separately authorizing the AG—and only the AG—to
seek certain remedies, including civil penalties under the state’s Deceptive
Trade Practices Act and the Medicaid Fraud False Claims Act.87 Thus, AG
Rutledge argued that if the prosecuting attorney’s suit were permitted to
proceed,
the State and its citizens face the distinct possibility of being
foreclosed from bringing those claims and being substantially
prejudiced in its recovery. . . . [T]he potential preclusive effect
of legal determinations made in the [prosecuting attorney’s
litigation] could result in the loss of millions of dollars in

85.
Id. at 708–10, nn.41–54.
86.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2458 (2021); see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.48 (West 2021) (authorizing actions by district or county attorneys with prior notice
to (statewide) consumer protection division).
87.
See Emergency Petition, supra note 78, at 14.
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damages that would otherwise have been awarded to the people
of Arkansas.88
Note that Rutledge was not objecting to the counties and cities suing
on their own behalf; her challenge was to a local attorney suing in the name
of the state—an arrangement that raises distinctive concerns about
foreclosing other state actors (including the AG) from going after the same
defendant again in another suit with, as Rutledge put it, “better claims.”89
It’s hard to see the wisdom of a state system that authorizes local
governments to stand in the state’s shoes for litigation purposes while
denying them tools that are available to the state.
Yet even when state and local authorities have parallel authority to
pursue certain claims, their capacities may be meaningfully different.
Among other advantages, state AGs typically have significant pre-filing
investigative authority. While most civil litigants rely on the formal
machinery of discovery to give them the tools they need to dig into the
defendant’s conduct, state AGs can issue subpoenas to require the
attendance of witnesses or the production of documents or other evidence,
conduct hearings, examine records, and more—all prior to commencing
an action.90 This power is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it means
that AGs can present the court with a detailed and thorough complaint
more likely to survive a motion to dismiss. On the other hand, courts may
come to expect more from AGs and be less inclined to grant them the
benefit of the doubt when they are unable to connect all the dots during
the early stages of the case. Investigations take time, too. In a race to the
courthouse door, local governments are likely to get there faster precisely
because they often do not—cannot—engage in the same kind of pre-filing
investigation as the AG. But local claims may be weaker as a result. In a
zero-sum world in which only one claim can be brought on behalf of the
state or its people, it’s not hard to see why AGs would believe (with some
justification) that they should get priority.
The scope of civil investigative authority is largely a function of state
law. The San Francisco City Attorney, for example, has authority under
San Francisco’s city Charter and Administrative Code to investigate
claims, including by issuing subpoenas to compel testimony and the
production of records.91 And some consumer protection statutes grant
investigative authority to local attorneys as well as the state AG.92 Others

88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 12.
90.
See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 248 (Emily
Myers & Nat’l Assoc. of Att’ys Gen. eds., 4th ed. 2018) (describing investigative
authority).
91.
S.F. CHARTER § 6.102; S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 2A.230.
92.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-107 (2021).
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do not, however, even when they otherwise authorize local suits.93 The
discussion here can only scratch the surface, but it underscores the point
that simply granting localities the authority to sue on behalf of the state is
only a first step—and can provoke predictable and often justifiable
conflicts between state and local litigators when the former are, as a
practical matter, in a stronger position than the latter to represent the same
client.
A different set of issues arises when AGs challenge local litigation
involving claims not on behalf of the state but on behalf of the local
government itself, or local citizens. AGs may enjoy various advantages in
these cases as well—including access to parens patriae standing and the
ability to avoid removal to federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction94—but the source of the conflict is significantly less clear.
Ohio AG Dave Yost’s challenge to local county participation in the
opioids MDL is an example.95 In his brief seeking mandamus from the
Sixth Circuit to stop the bellwether trial involving claims by two Ohio
counties (the same claims he insisted “belong to” the state of Ohio96), Yost
argued that “any judgment or settlement between two Ohio counties and
the defendants will draw down a limited pool of money to satisfy these
claims, and will do so in a way that risks defenses that are unique as against
the counties.”97 He continued,
Cities (and other political subdivisions) have frequently lost
claims like those in the bellwether trial because they have been
unable to satisfy proximate cause. Unlike its subdivisions, Ohio
has standing to sue without regard to proximate cause. As parens
patriae, Ohio has standing to assert claims based on harms to the
health and welfare of its citizens. Ohio’s ability to bring such
claims—and its political subdivisions [sic] inability to do so—
means that Ohio is better able to seek justice for its citizens.
93.
Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-05.1 (2021) (granting investigative
authority to the AG), with id. § 51-10-06 (2021) (providing that “[t]he attorney general and
the several state’s attorneys shall institute suits in behalf of this state, to prevent and restrain
violations of the provisions of this chapter”).
94.
See supra notes 23–28 (discussing parens patriae authority); California v.
Perdue Pharma, L.P., No. SACV 14-1080-JLS, 2014 WL 6065907, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(remanding opioid suit to state court because “[a] state is not a citizen of itself and thus
cannot be a party to a diversity action”).
95.
Although some of the counties’ claims, such as the public nuisance claims
noted above, were asserted on behalf of the state, most were not and instead focused on
harms to the counties themselves and to local citizens. Corrected Second Amended
Complaint and Jury Demand, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., Cnty. of Summit v.
Purdue Pharma L.P., 17-md-0204 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 2018) (listing parties and their
claims).
96.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 1.
97.
Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Second, the State can maintain claims otherwise barred by
statutes of limitations. Statutes of limitations in Ohio generally
do not apply as a bar to the rights of the state. But, because the
rule is an attribute of sovereignty only, it does not extend to
townships, counties, school districts or boards of education, and
other subdivisions of the state.98
Yost’s brief doesn’t explain why the risk that local governments
might lose their cases would prejudice the state or its citizens—a failed
claim would not, after all, “draw down a limited pool of money,” and a
loss by a local government acting on its own behalf wouldn’t bar the state
from pursuing its own claims against the same defendant. Reading
between the lines, the worry seems to be that the counties will be in a
weaker position to negotiate settlement if their claims are subject to
promising defenses, and in the unique context of an MDL, testing
(potentially weak) county claims in a bellwether trial could undermine the
negotiating position of the broader group of government plaintiffs. Even
if state AGs manage to avoid any formal entanglement with the MDL, their
own settlement position will be weakened if the defendants have already
paid out substantial sums to state subdivisions (even if those sums are
diminished by defenses the state could have avoided). The state as a whole
would be better off, then, the argument seems to go, if the whole matter
were left in the AG’s hands.
This kind of conflict—in which a state AG seeks to quash truly local
litigation as opposed to litigation by a local actor who seeks to represent
the state itself—appears to be relatively uncommon.99 It may be that the
opioid MDL is distinctive, if not unique, with Judge Polster’s repeated and
vocal emphasis on obtaining global settlement bringing to the fore
concerns about local resolutions getting in the way of the state’s own
efforts.100 I return to the question of global settlement below, but for
present purposes it’s worth emphasizing once again that arguments like
Yost’s are contingent on the details of state law. There may be some force
to the claim that if state law puts local suits at a disadvantage, and the AG
is actively pursuing the same (or broader) relief, then the AG is in a better
position in that particular case to represent the locality and its citizens.
Such an argument does not, however, provide a basis for disfavoring local
litigation in circumstances in which the AG is not inclined to proceed, or

98.
Id. at 22–23 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
99.
For another example, see State v. City of Dover, 891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006)
(describing conflict between New Hampshire AG and cities of Dover and Portsmouth).
100.
See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings Had Before the Honorable Dan Aaron
Polster at 62, 72–73, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., County of Summit v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., 17-md-0204 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 2018).
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for changing state law to make local litigation even more difficult or to
give the AG priority over local claims more broadly.
C. Resource Differentials and Reliance on Private Counsel
In addition to the advantages that may be bestowed (or withheld) by
state statutes authorizing state and local litigators to pursue particular
enforcement efforts, the success of any given suit may depend, as a
practical matter, on the resources available to support it. Here, too, state
AGs may hold an advantage over their counterparts in local government—
though it’s critical to attend to the variety hidden within the larger
categories of “local” or “municipal” litigation. Big cities with affirmative
litigation departments, like San Francisco, are in a wildly different position
from, say, a local prosecuting attorney with a shoestring budget. Even if
the same doctrinal and investigative tools are available to the state and
local litigators under state law, differences in staffing, funding, and
expertise may give some government units significant advantages over
others.
Resource limitations also may give local governments strong
incentives to partner with private counsel, who can fund litigation out of
their own war chests and supply needed people-power and know-how. On
balance, state AGs may be less likely than cash-strapped municipalities to
find it necessary to outsource the government’s legal work. When AGs do
rely on private counsel, moreover, such arrangements are subject to
regulation in many states, with statutes requiring that government officials
retain primary decision-making authority and capping the total amount of
fees that can be paid to outside counsel.101 For the most part, those laws
apply only to the AG and other state officials; as written, they don’t extend
to local government suits, including those brought on behalf of the state.102
Reliance on private counsel can have various consequences,
including for how claims are structured and prioritized, which I’ve detailed
in other work.103 But one feature stands out in particular in state-local
litigation conflicts: private attorneys will take a cut of the proceeds for
101.
See Lemos, supra note 21, at 543–44, nn.158–59 (describing regulation); see
also Nick Bowman, Policy Analysis: Outside Counsel in SLC Member States, S. LEGIS.
CONF.
(Nov.
2016),
https://www.slcatlanta.org/research/index.php?pub=515
[https://perma.cc/C7AT-HJHF].
102.
E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-16-714(d) (2021) (applying caps and other
regulations to fee arrangement with AG); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-4803 (2021) (same,
for “the state”); IOWA CODE § 13.7 (2021) (same); IOWA CODE § 23B.3 (2021) (same);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-8 (2021) (same, for “the state, an arm or agency of the state, or a
statewide elected officer acting in his official capacity”). California courts have held that
municipal counsel must maintain control of any litigation in which the municipality is
represented by private counsel. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement, supra note 12, at
1918 n.77.
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See generally Lemos, supra note 21.
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their fees.104 In the opioid cases and elsewhere, state AGs have argued that
local efforts should yield to state suits in part because states can avoid
shaving off a sizeable slice of any recovery for attorney’s fees. As
Tennessee AG Herbert Slatery put it when seeking to intervene in local
opioids litigation, “Our consistent position has been that all recoveries go
to the state and affected areas, not to outside attorneys.”105
Sometimes, however, AGs challenge localities’ reliance on private
counsel in terms that could be borrowed from the Chamber of Commerce
and in cases where the state is not seeking any recoveries at all. An
example is Ex parte Attorney General Troy King v. CVS Caremark.106
Alabama deceptive trade practices law authorizes both the AG and the
local district attorney to file suit on behalf of the state.107 Five DAs did just
that, suing CVS and other pharmacies for allegedly substituting generic
for name-brand medications without approval of the doctors who wrote
the prescriptions.108 Alabama AG Troy King promptly moved to dismiss
the suits.109 (That move was permissible, the Alabama Supreme Court
eventually held, because although Alabama law authorizes both the AG
and the DA to initiate actions, other provisions granting the AG authority
to supervise, advise, and instruct litigation on behalf of the state give the
AG a trump card.110) While the cases were pending, King wrote an op-ed
charging that DAs had been promised a “huge payoff” by the private
attorneys they hired for work on the cases.111 He warned that “[n]o
business is safe in a state where lawyers can shop an extortion scheme to
42 local district attorneys, some of whom will surely take the bait.”112
“Make no mistake,” King wrote, “it is a settlement they seek. . . . They
know that it will be so expensive to defend these suits that the defendants
are likely to give in to the shakedown. This is extortion by litigation pure
and simple and it is wrong.”113
AG King explained that the same private attorneys had come to him
first, but he declined to hire them because they “lacked evidence to bring
a lawsuit.”114 We cannot know, of course, whether the claims against the
pharmacies had any merit or not. The key point for present purposes is that
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 533.
STATEMENT ON OPIOID LITIGATION, supra note 63.
59 So. 3d 21 (Ala. 2010).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 22–24.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
John O’Brien, King Responds to District Attorneys with Op-Ed Piece, LEGAL
NEWSLINE (Oct. 15, 2009), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/510521657-king[https://perma.cc/A8AD-4LKP].
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
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King’s objection is markedly different from the argument other AGs have
raised about local reliance on private counsel in cases involving parallel
state enforcement: that action by the state will be more effective because
it can avoid the payment of hefty attorney’s fees.115 King was not
proposing to go after the defendants himself; he thought they should be
left alone. And his broader point was that local litigators should not be
permitted to hire private attorneys to represent the state (or perhaps at
all)116—an idea the Chamber of Commerce also has championed so as to
“discourage most municipal plaintiffs.”117 The objection seems to have
less to do with the distinctive features of local litigation than with the threat
of litigation, full stop. That’s a natural position for the Chamber to take,
but, without more, it provides little reason to prefer state litigation over the
local alternative—indeed, the Chamber has challenged state litigation on
similar terms.118
D. Destination and Distribution of Financial Recoveries
Concerns about attorney fees relate to a broader source of conflict
between states and local governments: where the money goes. Most states’
laws provide that funds recovered in state litigation will go to the general
treasury to be allocated via legislative appropriations in the same manner
as any other revenue.119 In some instances, AGs can take advantage of socalled “revolving funds” that permit their offices to retain a percentage of
recoveries for use in future enforcement efforts.120 State law may prescribe
different rules for certain categories of funds, and state-led settlements
likewise may make specific provision for the destination and use of money
recovered in litigation.121 But the money doesn’t always end up being used
to redress the relevant injuries or prevent similar harms from occurring in
the future.122 Big Tobacco again looms large in the rearview: states
notoriously used funds from the $200 billion Master Settlement for a

115.
116.
117.
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See, e.g., supra note 105 and accompanying text.
O’Brien, supra note 111.
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 2, at 31.
See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC
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Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127
HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 n.47 (2014).
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Id. at 866–67.
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See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative
Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 528–29 (2012) (discussing
concerns with settlement distributions in state-led suits).
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variety of purposes entirely unrelated to tobacco, including balancing their
general budgets.123
From the perspective of a local government that has suffered (and
seen its citizens suffer) significant harms at the defendant’s hands, the
prospect that state recoveries may be diverted from their intended uses—
or simply that they may be depleted addressing injuries elsewhere in the
state—can provide a compelling argument in favor of local control.124
Judge Polster captured the concern in characteristically blunt terms in the
opioids MDL:
The problem is that in a number of States any money that . . . a
State Attorney General obtains . . . goes into the general fund.
And the men and women who control what happens in the
general fund are the elected state representatives and senators.
That’s what they do. And that’s what happened in the tobacco
litigation. Over $200 billion, far more than 90 percent of that
was used for public purposes totally unrelated to tobacco
smoking, lung cancer, whatever. And I believe that’s why we
have all these counties and cities that filed separate lawsuits, to
make sure that doesn’t happen again.125
State AGs, meanwhile, are likely to see a converse set of problems
with—as a group of thirty-eight AGs put it—“[d]oling out small buckets
of funds without regard to how the funds should be spent [in a]
‘coordinated’ response, which would balance statewide efforts[,] such as
public education campaigns, with local efforts.”126 The AGs argued that
the allocation system proposed by the MDL plaintiffs, which would
distribute settlement funds based on the number of opioid victims within
each jurisdiction “regardless of whether caring for the victims falls to
State, county or municipal officials,” threatened to “override State
decision-making about how best to apply resources to the [opioid]
epidemic and may well interfere with existing State programs and
priorities.”127 Ohio AG Yost, for his part, described Judge Polster’s
comments as a frank acknowledgement that the local opioid suits “are
intended to avoid Ohio Rev. Code § 109.21, which states that all recoveries
by the Attorney General will be placed into the general fund.”128

123.
Id. at 528 n.182.
124.
See, e.g., LETTER FROM 14 DISTRICT ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO HERBERT H.
SLATERY, supra note 63 (expressing concerns about destination of any settlement funds as
reason for pursuing independent local litigation).
125.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 10.
126.
Letter to Court from Attorneys General, supra note 64, at 3.
127.
Id. at 3–4.
128.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 20.
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Earlier we saw AG Yost arguing that the counties had relatively weak
claims—the worry seeming to be that counties and other local government
units might either lose their claims or win on terms much worse than what
the state could get.129 Here we see Yost and other AGs expressing a
different set of concerns. One is that, if they win their claims or manage to
negotiate a settlement, local governments might capture a disproportionate
share of limited funds.130 State AGs also might worry about how the
money is going to be spent and wish to maintain control of that sort of
decision-making at the state level.
It’s worth noting, however, that while AGs will likely favor statelevel decision-making on the allocation of funds, they have little reason to
prefer laws like Ohio’s directing all recoveries to the general fund. Indeed,
shortly after lodging his objection to Judge Polster’s approach in the opioid
litigation, Yost proposed a constitutional amendment that would have
created a Recovery Foundation responsible for allocating opioid-related
proceeds to different resources around the state, including local
governments, as well as investing some of the money in order to preserve
funds for future uses.131 After legislative leaders declined to hold a vote on
the proposed amendment in time to place it on the 2020 ballot,132 Yost
joined with Ohio Governor Mike DeWine to announce that they had
reached agreement with local governments representing approximately
85% of the state’s population to adopt a “OneOhio” plan “to jointly
approach settlement negotiations and litigation with the drug
manufacturers and distributors of opioids.”133 Under the plan, 11% of any
opioid settlement funds134 would be reserved for attorney’s fees and the
129.
See supra notes 95–98.
130.
Letter to Court from Attorneys General, supra note 64, at 3–4.
131.
Andy Chow, Yost Pitches Constitutional Amendment to Protect Opioid
Settlement Money, STATEHOUSE NEWS BUREAU (Dec. 6, 2019, 4:16 PM),
https://www.statenews.org/post/yost-pitches-constitutional-amendment-protect-opioidsettlement-money [https://perma.cc/Q7DN-ZLRU].
132.
The timeline was extremely tight: Yost introduced the proposal on December
2, 2019, and in order to put a constitutional amendment on the 2020 ballot, lawmakers
would have had to pass a resolution by December 18 (90 days before the March primaries).
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Press Release, Governor Mike DeWine of Ohio, Attorney General
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Announce
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(Mar.
11,
2020),
https://governor.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/governor/media/news-and-media/governorattorney-general-announce-oneohio-agreement [https://perma.cc/9H4C-TH9L].
134.
The plan defines “settlement” as “the negotiated resolution of legal or
equitable claims against a Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Participant when that resolution
has been jointly entered into by the State, the [MDL plaintiffs’ executive committee] and
the Local Governments.” Memorandum from Governor Mike DeWine & Attorney General
Dave Yost to the Local Governments & Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, at 1 (Feb. 19,
2020),
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remainder divided among the state and local governments; 30% would be
set aside for community recovery and go directly to local governments;
55% would go to a statewide foundation, largely as envisioned in Yost’s
proposed amendment; and 15% would go to the office of the AG.135 The
plan also provides for joint state-local settlement negotiations and states
that any proposed settlement “shall be subject to approval by Local
Governments and the State.”136
Similarly, some state laws provide for a more targeted and granular
distribution of litigation proceeds than the default approach of sending all
state recoveries to the general treasury, while all local recoveries go to the
governmental unit responsible for prosecuting the case. California’s unfair
and deceptive acts and practices statute, for example, authorizes both state
and local attorneys to seek both injunctive and financial relief “in the name
of the people of the State of California.”137 It goes on to prescribe rules for
distributions of any penalties collected, allocating half of any penalties
collected by the AG to the general fund and half to “the treasurer of the
county in which the judgment was entered.”138 For actions brought by
county-level attorneys (district attorneys or county counsel), the entirety
of the penalty goes to the relevant county.139 And in city cases, half of the
funds go to the city and half to the county.140 In all instances, the “funds
shall be for the exclusive use by the Attorney General, the district attorney,
the county counsel, and the city attorney for the enforcement of consumer
protection laws.”141 Like the Ohio example above, the California statute
makes clear that the battle lines over the destination and use of litigation
proceeds are set by state law; the default arrangements are just that—
defaults—and can be changed in ways that may reshape some state-local
litigation conflicts and avoid others.
E. Coordination, Settlement, and Global Peace
When state AGs pursue affirmative litigation, they often—and
increasingly—work together. Multistate actions and settlements are
%20%20Public%20Law%20Monday%20Message&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=e
mail&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_AfAtgADMT5eZ0skoc17lo7YZ4A9J8UFKlzypNUydbLiOOmqU8puBlOHsvZkfjJ9GwjZe [https://perma.cc/SN32-HK4U].
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Press Release, Governor Mike DeWine of Ohio, supra note 133.
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Memorandum from Governor Mike DeWine & Attorney General Dave Yost
to the Local Governments & Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, supra note 134, at 8.
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growing in both size and frequency, helped along by longstanding
relationships among AG offices as well as time-tested strategies for
achieving agreement among numerous states.142 Multistate actions allow
states to pool their own resources while forcing the defendant to respond
to multiple actions across the country—a strategy one former AG called
“rolling thunder,” which can significantly enhance AGs’ leverage.143 Even
before any complaints are filed, interstate coordination in investigation can
be key when AGs are addressing conduct and harms that extend across
state lines. Indeed, given states’ capacity for pre-filing investigation,
multistate settlements may not technically be settlements of a pending
legal action, but agreements negotiated prior to the commencement of any
suit. That was the case, for example, when AGs from forty-eight states
plus the District of Columbia entered into an “Assurance of Voluntary
Compliance or Discontinuance” with Time Consumer Marketing, Inc., in
August 2000.144 The Assurance was the culmination of a multi-state
investigation into Time’s sweepstakes mailing practices.145 In it, Time
agreed to comply with numerous requirements for its future sweepstakes
mailings and to pay almost $5 million to consumers (as directed by the
states), as well as another $3.2 million to the states for their attorney’s fees
and other costs.146 In late June 2000, a little more than a month before the
agreement was finalized, the State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois (a
county-elected position), filed suit against Time, seeking restitution for
consumers and a $50,000 civil penalty under Illinois’s Consumer Fraud
Act for the same sweepstakes-related conduct.147 While that action was
pending, the AG and Time finalized the Assurance, which released Time
from all claims that were or could have been asserted under the consumer
fraud statute by the state and all of its subsidiaries.148 Time then moved to
dismiss the State’s Attorney’s suit on the ground that the claims had been
released.149 It pointed out that the consumer fraud act authorizes the AG
(and only the AG) to accept an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance150 and
argued that “no party would agree to give the Illinois Attorney General an
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See generally PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS
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assurance of voluntary compliance with the Consumer Fraud Act without
receiving a release from liability for past violations thereof.”151 The court
agreed, rejecting the State’s Attorney’s contention that the AG lacks power
to settle a claim filed by a State’s Attorney.152
The Time suit illustrates the interplay between local litigation and
multistate litigation, including pre-litigation investigation and settlement
by numerous AGs working in concert. One of the most common objections
AGs raise to local litigation is that it can disrupt the sometimes-delicate
negotiations between multiple AGs and the defendant(s).153 There are fifty
states, and state AGs have established formal and informal institutions to
facilitate cooperation and coordination among them.154 There are, by
contrast, tens of thousands of local governments, often overlapping (e.g.,
counties and cities), with vast variations in size, resources, authority, and
governance structures.155 The number of local governments is part of what
makes the prospect of local litigation so threatening to the Chamber of
Commerce and the interests it represents. As the Chamber put it in its
amicus brief in the opioids MDL,
Litigating and negotiating with 50 state attorneys general is
much easier than doing so with thousands of municipalities. The
feeding frenzy of municipal lawsuits makes global settlements
nearly impossible. And the resulting lack of finality and
predictability risks bankrupting smaller businesses and severely
stunting the stability and growth of larger ones.156
It’s easy to see why defendants would recoil at the notion of facing
suit by thousands of local governments. And the threat posed by local
litigation might provide useful leverage for settlement—a good thing from
the perspective of both state and local litigators. The question, however, is
who (if anyone) is capable of controlling the lever. Because of their limited
number and their own capacity for coordination, state AGs can work
effectively as a group in settlement negotiations. And, significantly, they
can often offer defendants a form of global peace. That gives states a
powerful bargaining chip in settlement negotiations, creating the potential
for states (and their citizens) to capture the additional value defendants
place on such peace. Absent creative new coordinating mechanisms like
the negotiation class Judge Polster certified in the opioid MDL, localities
151.
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152.
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153.
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Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner State of Ohio at 3–4, In re State of Ohio, No. 193827 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2019).
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simply cannot make the same offer.157 In the opioids litigation, for
example, even if the 2,000-plus local entities already in the MDL could
reach an agreement on settlement, they couldn’t speak for the tens of
thousands of other localities that have not yet sued but might.158
For state AGs, several points follow. To begin with, states’ ability
(and localities’ inability) to coordinate among themselves and offer global
peace gives states an arguable advantage in settlement negotiations: AGs
may be able to get more money for the state than localities can—and get
it more quickly—because they can negotiate effectively and efficiently
and perhaps even extract a peace premium. A great deal turns, however,
on state AGs’ power to release or otherwise preclude local suits upon the
completion of the state’s own action, as in the Time case—a question
controlled by state law.159 To the extent that local governments can sue
notwithstanding a state settlement, the value of states’ peace offering is
diminished accordingly. And if AGs must corral a large and unruly group
of local governments in order to reach any sort of deal with the defendant,
settlement may be delayed or blocked entirely.160 Hence state AGs’
concern about local litigation disrupting a fragile multistate negotiation or
shrinking the states’ own recoveries.161
CONCLUSION
Examining conflicts between state AGs and local litigators reveals a
somewhat surprising culprit: state law. The disputes exposed in the
sprawling opioids litigation and elsewhere are not easily explained by the
political patterns that dominate clashes between state and local
governments in the regulatory context, with red-state legislatures moving
to quash progressive innovations at the local level (patterns that sometimes
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also pit blue states against bluer cities).162 Disputes over litigation
authority instead have tended to focus on competing claims of
effectiveness and hinge on state laws that empower local litigation on
terms different from those governing litigation by the state AG. Indeed,
virtually all the factors discussed above—factors that differentiate state
and local litigation, sometimes fueling conflict between the two—are
created, and could be changed, by state law.
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